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Abstract
In this paper we provide an alternative semantics for Equilibrium Logic and its monotonic
basis, the logic of Here-and-There (also known as Go¨del’s G3 logic) that relies on the idea of
denotation of a formula, that is, a function that collects the set of models of that formula.
Using the three-valued logic G3 as a starting point and an ordering relation (for which
equilibrium/stable models are minimal elements) we provide several elementary operations
for sets of interpretations. By analysing structural properties of the denotation of formulas,
we show some expressiveness results for G3 such as, for instance, that conjunction is not
expressible in terms of the other connectives. Moreover, the denotational semantics allows
us to capture the set of equilibrium models of a formula with a simple and compact set
expression. We also use this semantics to provide several formal definitions for entailment
relations that are usual in the literature, and further introduce a new one called strong
entailment. We say that α strongly entails β when the equilibrium models of α ∧ γ are
also equilibrium models of β ∧ γ for any context γ. We also provide a characterisation
of strong entailment in terms of the denotational semantics, and give an example of a
sufficient condition that can be applied in some cases.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Equilibrium Logic
1 Introduction
In the last 15 years, the paradigm of Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1999;
Niemela¨ 1999; Brewka et al. 2011) has experienced a boost in practical tools and
applications that has come in parallel with a series of significant results in its theo-
retical foundations. Focusing on the latter, a long way has been traversed since the
original definition of the stable models semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) for
normal logic programs, until the current situation where stable models constitute a
∗ This research was partially supported by Spanish MEC project TIN2013-42149-P.
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complete non-monotonic approach for arbitrary theories in the syntax of First Or-
der Logic (Pearce and Valverde 2004a; Ferraris et al. 2007). An important break-
through that undoubtfully contributed to this evolution was the characterization of
stable models in terms of Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 1996; Pearce 2006), allowing
a full coverage of arbitrary propositional theories and inspiring a new definition
of program reduct for that syntax (Ferraris 2005). Equilibrium Logic is defined in
terms of a model minimisation criterion for an intermediate logic called the Logic
of Here-and-There (HT) first introduced in (Heyting 1930) and, shortly after, reap-
peared in (Go¨del 1932) as Go¨del’s three-valued logic G3. In (Lifschitz et al. 2001)
it was shown that equivalence in HT was a necessary and sufficient condition for
the property of strong equivalence, that is, that two programs yield the same sta-
ble/equilibrium models regardless of the context in which they may be included.
After that, many theoretical results have followed from the use of Equilibrium Logic
and HT, such as the study of variants of strong equivalence (Pearce and Valverde 2004b;
Woltran 2008) or the series of papers considering different forms of strongly equiva-
lent transformations (Cabalar et al. 2005; Cabalar and Ferraris 2007; Cabalar et al. 2007).
Besides, Equilibrium Logic allowed the already mentioned extension to first or-
der syntax (Pearce and Valverde 2004a), engendering an extensive literature, as
well as many other extensions such as the inclusion of a strong negation oper-
ator (Odintsov and Pearce 2005) or new formalisms such as Partial Equilibrium
Logic (Cabalar et al. 2007), Temporal Equilibrium Logic (Aguado et al. 2013) or,
more recently, Infinitary Equilibrium Logic (Harrison et al. 2014).
All these contributions provide results about HT or Equilibrium Logic that are
proved with meta-logical textual descriptions. These proofs lack a common formal
basis on which meta-properties of HT and Equilibrium Logic can be mathematically
or even automatically checked. Another interesting observation is that many of these
theoretical results in the literature use the concept of sets of models of different
types: classical models, HT models, equilibrium models, etc. It is, therefore, natural
to wonder whether a formal treatment of sets of interpretations could help in the
development of fundamental results for Equilibrium Logic and ASP.
In this paper we explore the idea of characterising HT (or G3) and Equilibrium
Logic using the concept of denotation of a formula. Given a formula α, its denotation
Jα K collects the set of G3 models of α and can be described as a compositional
function, that is, the denotation of a formula is a function of the denotations of its
subformulas. Since their introduction by (Scott and Strachey 1971), denotations
constitute a common device for defining the semantics of programming languages,
although their use for non-classical logics is also frequent – a prominent case, for
instance, is the semantics of µ-Calculus (Kozen 1983). The use of denotational
semantics in Logic Programming is not so common: in the case of Prolog we can
mention (Nicholson and Foo 1989) but for ASP, to the best of our knowledge, no
attempt has previously been made.
Here we explain how the denotational semantics actually constitutes an alterna-
tive description of HT/G3 and provides several interesting features. We define some
elementary operations on sets of interpretations and the ordering relation used in
the equilibrium models minimisation. Using those elementary set operations and
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analysing structural properties of the denotation of formulas, we derive some ex-
pressivity results for G3 such as, for instance, that conjunction is not expressible in
terms of implication, falsum and disjunction. More importantly, we are able to cap-
ture the equilibrium models of a formula as a set expression constituting a subset
of Jα K. This allows us to study properties of equilibrium models by using formal
results from set theory, something that in many cases is more compact than an
informal proof in natural language and, moreover, has allowed us to use a theorem
prover for a semi-automated verification (see the sequel (Aguado et al. 2015) of the
current paper).
As an application of the denotational semantics, we provide several definitions (in
terms of denotations) for entailment relations foundl in the literature, and further
introduce a new one called strong entailment. We say that α strongly entails β
when the equilibrium models of α ∧ γ are also equilibrium models of β ∧ γ for any
context γ. This obviously captures one of the directions of strong equivalence. We
also provide the corresponding denotational characterisation for this new strong
entailment and give an example of a sufficient condition that can be applied in
some cases.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide the basic
definitions of Go¨del’s G3 logic that, as explained, is an equivalent formulation of
HT. In Section 3 we describe several useful operators on sets of interpretations
that we then use in Section 4 to define the denotational semantics for G3 and for
equilibrium models. After describing some applications of this semantics, Section 5
defines different types of entailments and, in particular, presents the idea of strong
entailment together with its denotational charaterisation and some examples. Fi-
nally, Section 6 concludes the paper. Most proofs have been collected in the on line
appendix (Appendix A).
2 Go¨del’s three-valued logic G3 and equilibrium models
We describe next the characterisation of Equilibrium Logic in terms of Go¨del’s
three-valued logic – for further details on multi-valued characterisations of Equilib-
rium Logic, see (Pearce 2006), section 2.4.
We start from a finite set of atoms Σ called the propositional signature. A formula
α is defined by the grammar:
α ::= ⊥ | p | α1 ∧ α2 | α1 ∨ α2 | α1 → α2
where α1 and α2 are formulas in their turn and p ∈ Σ is any atom. We define the
derived operators ¬α
def
= α→ ⊥ and ⊤
def
= ¬⊥. By LΣ we denote the language of all
well-formed formulas for signature Σ and just write L when the signature is clear
from the context.
A partial (or three-valued) interpretation is a mapping v : Σ→ {0, 1, 2} assigning
0 (false), 2 (true) or 1 (undefined) to each atom p in the signature Σ. A partial
interpretation v is said to be classical (or total) if v(p) 6= 1 for every atom p.
We write I and I c to stand for the set of all partial and total interpretations,
respectively (fixing signature Σ). Note that I c ⊆ I.
4 F. Aguado et al
For brevity, we will sometimes represent interpretations by (underlined) strings
of digits from {0, 1, 2} corresponding to the atom values, assuming the alphabetical
ordering in the signature. Thus, for instance, if Σ = {p, q, r}, the interpretation
v = 102 stands for v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0 and v(r) = 2.
Given any partial interpretation v ∈ I we define a classical interpretation vt ∈ I c
as:
vt(p)
def
=
{
2 if v(p) = 1
v(p) otherwise
In other words, vt is the result of transforming all 1’s in v into 2’s. For instance,
given v′ = 1021 for signature Σ = {p, q, r, s}, then v′t = 2022.
Definition 1 (Valuation of formulas)
Given a partial interpretation v ∈ I we define a corresponding valuation of formu-
las, a function also named v (by abuse of notation) of type v : L → {0, 1, 2} and
defined as:
v(α ∧ β)
def
= min(v(α), v(β))
v(α ∨ β)
def
= max(v(α), v(β))
v(⊥)
def
= 0
v(α→ β)
def
=
{
2 if v(α) ≤ v(β)
v(β) otherwise 
From the definition of negation, it is easy to see that v(¬α) = 2 iff v(α) = 0, and
v(¬α) = 0 otherwise. We say that v satisfies α when v(α) = 2. We say that v is a
model of a theory Γ iff v satisfies all the formulas in Γ.
Example 1
As an example, looking at the table for implication, the models of the formula:
¬p→ q (1)
are those where v(¬p) = 0 or v(q) = 2 or both v(¬p) = v(q) = 1. The latter is
impossible since the evaluation of negation never returns 1, whereas v(¬p) = 0
means v(p) 6= 0. Therefore, we get v(p) 6= 0 or v(q) = 2 leading to the following 7
models 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 02. 
Given two 3-valued interpretations u, v, we say that u ≤ v when, for any atom
p ∈ Σ, the following two conditions hold: u(p) ≤ v(p); and u(p) = 0 implies v(p) = 0.
As usual, we write u < v to stand for both u ≤ v and u 6= v. An equivalent, and
perhaps simpler, way of understanding u ≤ v is that we can get v by switching
some 1’s in u into 2’s. This immediately means that classical interpretations are ≤-
maximal, because they contain no 1’s. Moreover, since ut is the result of switching
all 1’s in u into 2’s, we easily conclude u ≤ ut for any u. As an example of how
≤ works, among models of (1), we can check that 10 < 20 and that 11, 12 and 21
are strictly smaller than 22. On the other hand, for instance, 10, 02 or 12 are all
pairwise incomparable.
Once we have defined an ordering relation among interpretations, we can define
the concept of equilibrium model as a ≤-minimal model that is also classical.
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Definition 2 (Equilibrium model)
A classical interpretation v ∈ I c is an equilibrium model of a theory Γ iff it is a
≤-minimal model of Γ. 
Back to the example (1), from the 7 models we obtained, only three of them
20, 22 and 02 are classical (they do not contain 1’s). However, as we saw, 20 is
not ≤-minimal since 10 < 20 and the same happens with 22, since 11, 12, 21 are
strictly smaller too. The only ≤-minimal classical model is 02, that is, p false and
q true, which becomes the unique equilibrium model of (1). Equilibrium models
coincide with the most general definition of stable models, for the syntax of arbi-
trary (propositional) formulas (Ferraris 2005). Indeed, we can check that model 02
coincides with the only stable model of the ASP rule (q ← not p) which is the usual
rewriting of formula (1) in ASP syntax.
3 Sets of interpretations
In this section we will introduce some useful operations on sets of interpretations.
Some of them depend on the partial ordering relation ≤. Given a set of interpreta-
tions S ⊆ I we will define the operations:
S
def
= I \ S S ↓
def
= {u ∈ I : there exists v ∈ S, v ≥ u}
Sc
def
= I c ∩ S S ↑
def
= {u ∈ I : there exists v ∈ S, v ≤ u}
To avoid too many parentheses, we will assume that ↓, ↑ and c have more priority
than standard set operations ∪, ∩ and \. As usual, we can also express set difference
S \S′ as S ∩S′. We can easily check that the c operation distributes over ∩ and ∪,
whereas ↓ and ↑ distribute over ∪. For intersection, we can only prove that:
Proposition 1
For any pair S, S′ of sets of interpretations:
(S ∩ S′) ↑ ⊆ S ↑ ∩ S′ ↑ and (S ∩ S′) ↓ ⊆ S ↓ ∩ S′ ↓. 
In the general case, the other direction does not hold. As a simple example, for
signature Σ = {p, q}, take S = {12} and S′ = {21}. Then S ↑= {12, 22} and
S′ ↑= {21, 22} and thus S ↑ ∩ S′ ↑= {22} but (S ∩ S′) ↑= ∅.
With these new operators we can formally express that vt is the only classical
interpretation greater than or equal to v in the following way:
Proposition 2
For any v ∈ I it holds that {v} ↑c = {vt}. 
Corollary 1
For any S ⊆ I and for any interpretation v we have: v ∈ Sc ↓ iff vt ∈ S. 
A particularly interesting type of sets of interpretations are those S satisfying
that, for any v ∈ S, we also have vt ∈ S. When this happens, we say that S is total-
closed or classically closed. As we will see, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between a total-closed set of interpretations and a set of models for some (set of
equivalent) formula(s). The definition of total-closed set can be formally captured
as follows:
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Proposition 3
The following three assertions are equivalent:
(i) S is total-closed (ii) S ⊆ Sc ↓ (iii) S ↑c= Sc. 
Lemma 1
For any set of interpretations S, it holds that (S)c ↓⊆ (Sc ↓). 
From this, together with Proposition 3 (ii) we immediately conclude
Proposition 4
For any total-closed set of interpretations S, it holds that (S)c ↓⊆ S. 
When S is a total-closed set of models, this proposition asserts that any interpre-
tation below a classical countermodel is also a countermodel. In fact, Proposition 4
corresponds to what (Cabalar and Ferraris 2007) defined as total-closed set of coun-
termodels S.
4 Denotational semantics
In this section we consider a denotational semantics for G3 and for equilibrium
models. Rather than saying when an interpretation v is a model of a formula ϕ,
the main idea is to capture the whole set of models of ϕ as a set of interpretations
we will denote by Jϕ K. As we explain next, this set can be completely defined by
structural induction without actually resorting to the valuation of formulas.
Definition 3 (Denotation)
The denotation of a formula ϕ, written Jϕ K, is recursively defined as follows
J⊥ K
def
= ∅ Jα ∧ β K
def
= Jα K ∩ Jβ K
J p K
def
= {v ∈ I : v(p) = 2} Jα ∨ β K
def
= Jα K ∪ Jβ K
Jα→ β K
def
=
(
Jα K ∪ Jβ K
)
∩
(
Jα K ∪ Jβ K
)
c
↓
where p ∈ Σ is an atom, and α, β ∈ L are formulas in their turn. 
We say that a formula α is a tautology iff Jα K = I and that the formula is
inconsistent iff Jα K = ∅. The following theorem shows that this definition actually
captures the set of models of α, i.e., the set of interpretations that make v(α) = 2
using G3 valuations of formulas (Definition 1). Moreover, it also proves that vt ∈
Jα K is equivalent to v(α) 6= 0.
Theorem 1
Let v ∈ I be a partial interpretation and α ∈ L a formula. Then:
(i) v(α) = 2 in G3 iff v ∈ Jα K.
(ii) v(α) 6= 0 in G3 iff vt ∈ Jα K. 
As v(α) = 2 implies v(α) 6= 0, then v ∈ Jα K implies vt ∈ Jα K and thus:
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Corollary 2
For any α ∈ L, Jα K is total-closed. 
In fact, this relation between models of a formula and total-closed sets of inter-
pretations also holds in the other direction, that is, for any total-closed set of
interpretations S, there always exists1 a formula α such that Jα K = S.
When compared to denotational semantics for other formalisms, it is clear that
the denotation of implication is the most representative characteristic of G3. Defin-
ing its denotation provides a powerful tool for studying fundamental properties of
this logic. For instance, we can derive the denotation for negation as J¬α K = Jα→
⊥ K = Jα K ∩ Jα Kc ↓= Jα Kc ↓ where the last step follows from Proposition 4. With
this correspondence and Corollary 1 we conclude that v ∈ J¬α K iff vt ∈ Jα K, that
is, v is a model of ¬α iff vt is a classical countermodel of α. Another application
example of the denotation of implication is, for instance, this simple proof of the
Deduction Theorem for G3.
Theorem 2
For any pair of formulas α, β: Jα K ⊆ Jβ K iff Jα → β K = I. Moreover, Jα K = Jβ K
iff Jα↔ β K = I.
Proof
For the result with implication, from left to right, assume Jα K ⊆ Jβ K. Then,(
Jα K∪Jβ K
)
= I and so, Jα→ β K = I ∩Ic ↓= I. For right to left, if Jα→ β K = I,
take any v ∈ Jα K. As v ∈ Jα → β K ⊆
(
Jα K ∪ Jβ K
)
we conclude v ∈ Jβ K. For the
double implication, simply note that Jα K = Jβ K now means Jα → β K = Jβ →
α K = I. Therefore, Jα↔ β K = Jα→ β K ∩ Jβ → α K = I ∩ I = I.
This denotation of implication is an intersection of two sets. We can also alterna-
tively capture implication as a union of sets:
Proposition 5
For any α, β ∈ L, it follows that:
Jα→ β K = Jα Kc ↓ ∪ (Jα K ∩ Jβ Kc ↓) ∪ Jβ K 
From this alternative representation of implication and the fact that Jα Kc ↓ ⊆
Jα K (from Proposition 4) we immediately conclude Jα K ∩ Jα→ β K = Jα K ∩ Jβ K.
In other words, we have trivially proved that Jα ∧ (α→ β) K = Jα ∧ β K in G3.
4.1 Expressiveness of operators
As an application of the denotational semantics, we will study the expressiveness of
the set of propositional operators usually provided as a basis forG3: {∧,∨,→,⊥}. In
Intuitionistic Logic, it is well-known that we cannot represent any of these operators
in terms of the others. In G3, however, it is also known that ∨ can be represented
in terms of ∧ and →. In particular:
1 This was proved in Theorem 2 from (Cabalar and Ferraris 2007) using the dual concept of
total-closed set of countermodels.
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Theorem 3
For any Σ, the system LΣ{⊥,∧,→} is complete because given any pair of formulas
α, β for Σ, it holds that: Jα ∨ β K = J (α→ β)→ β K ∩ J (β → α)→ α K. 
Now, one may wonder whether → or ∧ can be expressed in terms of the rest of
operators. However, we prove next that this is not the case.
Lemma 2
Let Σ = {p1, . . . , pn} and let γ ∈ LΣ{⊥,∧,∨}. Then J γ K ⊆
⋃n
i=1J pi K. 
Theorem 4
If {p1, p2} ⊆ Σ then p1 → p2 cannot be equivalently represented in LΣ{⊥,∨,∧}. 
This result is not surprising since we can further observe that the denotations for ∧
and ∨, respectively the intersection and the union, are monotonic with respect to
set inclusion, whereas Jα→ β K is monotonic for the consequent and anti-monotonic
for the antecedent (see Proposition ?? in the online appendix).
We will show next that conjunction cannot be expressed in terms of ∨,→,⊥. To
this aim, we begin proving the following lemma.
Lemma 3
Let Σ be of the form Σ = {p, q, . . .} and let γ ∈ LΣ{⊥,∨,→}, then for any subfor-
mula δ of γ and any v ∈ J δ K of the form v = 22 . . . (i.e. making both atoms true),
there exists some u ∈ J δ K such that u < v and u coincides with v in all atoms
excepting p, q. 
Theorem 5
If {p1, p2} ⊆ Σ then p1 ∧ p2 cannot be equivalently represented in LΣ{⊥,∨,→}. 
4.2 Denotation of equilibrium models
We can use the denotational semantics to capture equilibrium models as follows.
Theorem 6
A classical interpretation v ∈ I c is an equilibrium model of α iff it satisfies the
fixpoint condition Jα K ∩ {v} ↓ = {v}. 
The set of equilibrium models can also be captured as the denotation below.
Theorem 7
The set of equilibrium models of α, denoted as Jα Ke, corresponds to the expression:
Jα Ke
def
= Jα Kc \ (Jα K \ I c) ↑ 
As an application of Theorem 7, we have used it to obtain the following charac-
terisation of equilibrium models of a disjunction:
Proposition 6
For any pair of formulas α and β:
Jα ∨ β Ke =
(
Jα Ke \ Jβ Kc
)
∪
(
Jβ Ke \ Jα Kc
)
∪
(
Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Ke
)
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Proof
We begin applying some basic set operations:
Jα ∨ β Ke = Jα ∨ β Kc \ (Jα ∨ β K \ I c) ↑
=
(
Jα Kc ∪ Jβ Kc
)
\ ( (Jα K \ I c) ∪ (Jβ K \ I c) ) ↑
=
(
Jα Kc ∪ Jβ Kc
)
\ ( (Jα K \ I c) ↑ ∪ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑ )
=
(
Jα Kc ∪ Jβ Kc
)
∩ (Jα K \ I c) ↑ ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
= Jα Kc ∩ (Jα K \ I c) ↑ ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
∪ Jβ Kc ∩ (Jα K \ I c) ↑ ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
= Jα Ke ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ1
∪ Jβ Ke ∩ (Jα K \ I c) ↑︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ2
Since Jα Ke ⊆ Ic = (Jβ K ∪ Jβ K)c = Jβ Kc ∪ Jβ Kc we can rewrite γ1 as follows:
γ1 = Jα Ke ∩
(
Jβ Kc ∪ Jβ Kc
)
∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
= Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Kc ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jβ Ke
∪ Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Kc ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
= Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Ke ∪ Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Kc ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑
Now, we will prove that Jβ Kc ⊆ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑ and so, we can remove the latter
in γ1. To this aim, we will show that Jβ Kc ∩ (Jβ K \ I c) ↑= ∅. First, note that
Jβ Kc∩(Jβ K\I c) ↑= Jβ Kc∩(Jβ K\I c) ↑c. Then (Jβ K\I c) ↑c= (Jβ K∩I c) ↑c⊆ Jβ K ↑c
∩ I c ↑c⊆ Jβ K ↑c= Jβ Kc where, in the last step, we have used Proposition 3 (iii).
Finally, as Jβ Kc∩Jβ Kc = ∅, we conclude Jβ Kc∩(Jβ K\I c) ↑c= Jβ Kc∩(Jβ K\I c) ↑= ∅
too.
Therefore, we can further simplify the expression we obtained for γ1 as:
γ1 = Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Ke ∪ Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Kc = Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Ke ∪
(
Jα Ke \ Jβ Kc
)
Finally, making a similar reasoning for γ2 we get γ2 = Jα Ke∩ Jβ Ke∪
(
Jβ Ke \ Jα Kc
)
and the result in the enunciate follows from Jα ∨ β Ke = γ1 ∪ γ2.
In other words, equilibrium models of α∨ β consists of three possibilities: (1) com-
mon equilibrium models of α and β; (2) equilibrium models of α that are not
classical models of β; and (3), vice versa, equilibrium models of β that are not
classical models of α. Note that Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Ke ⊆ Jα ∨ β Ke ⊆ Jα Ke ∪ Jβ Ke. As an
example, consider the disjunction p ∨ (¬p → q) with α = p and β = (¬p → q).
The equilibrium models of each disjunct are J p Ke = {20} and J¬p → q Ke = {02},
respectively. Obviously, α and β have no common equilibrium model. Interpretation
02 is an equilibrium model of β and is not classical model of α, and thus, it is an
equilibrium model of α ∨ β. However, 20 is both an equilibrium model of α and a
classical model of β, and so it is disregarded. As a result, J p ∨ (¬p→ q) Ke = {02}.
As another example, take r ∨ (¬p → q). In this case, J r Ke = {002} and J¬p →
q Ke = {020}. Since each equilibrium model of one disjunct is not a classical model
of the other disjunct, J r ∨ (¬p→ q) Ke = J r Ke ∪ J¬p→ q Ke = {002, 020}.
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5 Entailment relations
Logical entailment is usually defined by saying that the models of a formula (or a
theory) are a subset of models of another formula (the entailed consequence). In
our setting, we may consider different sets of models of a same formula α: Jα K,
Jα Kc and Jα Ke. Therefore, it is not so strange that we can find different types of
entailments for ASP in the literature. We summarize some of them in the following
definition.
Definition 4
Given two formulas α, β we say that:
α entails β (in G3), written α |= β, iff Jα K ⊆ Jβ K
α classically entails β, written α |=c β, iff Jα Kc ⊆ Jβ Kc
α skeptically entails β, written α |=sk β, iff Jα Ke ⊆ Jβ Kc
α credulously entails β, written α |=cr β, iff Jα Ke ∩ Jβ Kc 6= ∅
α weakly entails β, written α |=e β iff Jα Ke ⊆ Jβ Ke
α strongly entails β, written α |=s β, iff for any formula γ,
α ∧ γ |=e β ∧ γ, that is,
Jα ∧ γ Ke ⊆ Jβ ∧ γ Ke 
The first two relations, |= and |=c, correspond to logical entailments in the mono-
tonic logics of G3 and classical propositional calculus, respectively. Obviously, G3
entailment implies classical entailment (remember that Sc = S ∩Ic). The next two
entailments, |=sk and |=cr are typically used for non-monotonic queries where α is
assumed to be a program and β some query in classical logic. In this way, β is a
skeptical (resp. credulous) consequence of α if any (resp. some) equilibrium model
of α is a classical model of β. In (Pearce 2006), an equilibrium entailment, α |∼ β,
is defined as α |=sk β when Jα K 6= I and Jα Ke 6= ∅, and α |=c β otherwise.
The direct entailment between two programs would correspond to |=e which
we have called here weak entailment. The idea is that α |=e β means that the
equilibrium models of program α are also equilibrium models of β. An operational
reading of this entailment is that, in order to obtain equilibrium models for β, we
can try solving α and, if a solution for the latter is found, it will also be a solution
to the original program. If this same relation holds for any context γ, i.e., we can
replace β by α inside some larger program and the solutions of the result are still
solutions for the original program, then we talk about strong entailment.
To the best of our knowledge, the strong entailment relation has not been studied
in the literature although its induced equivalence relation, strong equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 2001),
is well-known and was, in fact, one of the main motivations that originated the in-
terest in ASP for G3 and equilibrium logic. It is obvious that strong entailment
implies weak entailment (it suffices with taking γ = ⊤). Using the previous entail-
ment relations, we can define several equivalence relations by considering entailment
in both directions. As a result, we get the following derived characterisations:
Definition 5
Given two formulas α, β we say that:
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α is equivalent to β (in G3), written α ≡ β, iff Jα K = Jβ K
α is classically equivalent to β, written α ≡c β, iff Jα Kc = Jβ Kc
α is weakly equivalent to β, written α ≡e β iff Jα Ke = Jβ Ke
α is strongly equivalent to β, written α ≡s β, iff for any formula γ,
Jα ∧ γ Ke = Jβ ∧ γ Ke. 
Note how α ≡s β iff both α |=s β and β |=s α. The following result is a rephrasing
of the main theorem in (Lifschitz et al. 2001).
Theorem 8 (From Theorem 1 in (Lifschitz et al. 2001))
Two formulas α, β are strongly equivalent iff they are equivalent in G3 (or HT). In
other words: α ≡s β iff α ≡ β. 
It is, therefore, natural to wonder whether this relation also holds for entailment,
that is, whether strong entailment α |=s β also corresponds to entailment2 in G3,
α |= β. However, it is easy to see that these two relations are different. As a
counterexample, let α = (p ∨ q) and β = (¬p→ q) from Example 1. We can easily
check that α |= β: indeed, Jα K = {20, 02, 21, 12, 22} ⊆ Jβ K as we saw in Example 1.
However, the interpretation 20 (p true and q false) is an equilibrium model of α
which is not equilibrium model of β. Thus, α 6|=e β and so α 6|=s β either, since
weak entailment is obviously a necessary condition for strong entailment.
Fortunately, strong entailment can be compactly captured using the denotational
semantics, as we prove next. We begin proving an auxiliary result.
Lemma 4
Given any v ∈ I, let γv be the formula:
γv
def
=
∧
v(p)=2
p
Then, for any formula α and any v ∈ Jα Kc, we have v ∈ Jα ∧ γv Ke. 
Theorem 9
α |=s β iff the following two conditions hold:
(i) α |=c β
(ii) Jα Kc ↓ ∩ Jβ K ⊆ Jα K
Proof
We are going to start proving that the two conditions are sufficient for α |=s β.
Let us take any formula γ and any v ∈ Jα ∧ γ Ke. Then both v ∈ J γ Kc and v ∈
Jα Kc ⊆ Jβ Kc. Thus, v ∈ Jβ ∧ γ Kc. Suppose we had some u < v, u ∈ Jβ ∧ γ K.
Then, u ∈ Jα Kc ↓ because u < v ∈ Jα Kc. But then, u ∈ Jα Kc ↓ ∩ Jβ K ⊆ Jα K, and
as u ∈ J γ K too, we would get that v is not in equilibrium for α ∧ γ, reaching a
contradiction.
2 As a matter of fact, other authors (Delgrande et al. 2008; Slota and Leite 2014) have implicitly
or explicitly used HT entailment (i.e. our G3 relation |=) as one of the two directions of strong
equivalence without considering that there could exist a difference between |= and |=s as we
defined here.
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For proving that the two conditions are necessary, suppose α |=s β. For (i), take
v ∈ Jα Kc. Since v ∈ Jα∧γv Ke because of Lemma 4, it follows that v ∈ Jβ ∧γv Ke ⊆
Jβ Kc.
For (ii), take some u ∈ Jα Kc ↓ ∩ Jβ K and assume u 6∈ Jα K. Since u ∈ Jα Kc ↓ and
u 6∈ Jα K, we conclude ut ∈ Jα Kc and u < ut. Consider the formula:
γ := γu ∧
∧
u(p)=u(q)=1
p→ q
so that, obviously, u ∈ J γ K. We are going to show that ut ∈ Jα ∧ γ Ke but ut 6∈
Jβ ∧ γ Ke something that contradicts strong entailment. We begin observing that
ut 6∈ Jβ∧γ Ke because u ∈ J γ K∩Jβ K = J γ∧β K but u < ut so ut is not in equilibrium.
Now, to show ut ∈ Jα ∧ γ Ke, it is easy to see that ut ∈ Jα ∧ γ Kc, since we had
ut ∈ Jα Kc and u ∈ J γ K implies ut ∈ J γ Kc. To see that ut is in equilibrium, take
any w ∈ Jα∧ γ K such that w < ut. Now, notice that wt = ut, but w ∈ J γ K ⊆ J γu K
and, thus, the only possibility is that w ≥ u. Moreover w > u because w ∈ Jα K
while u 6∈ Jα K. From u < w < ut(= wt) we conclude that there exists some atom
p, u(p) = 1 and w(p) = 2, and some atom q, w(q) = 1 and wt(q) = ut(q) = 2. But
then, w(q) = 1 implies u(q) = 1 too and we get u(p) = u(q) = 1 so that implication
p→ q occurs in the conjunction in γ. However, w(p) = 2 and w(q) = 1 means that
w is not a model of p→ q, which contradicts the assumption w ∈ Jα ∧ γ K.
The proof to show that (ii) is a necessary condition for strong entailment relies
on showing that, if it does not hold, we can build a formula γ (a logic program) for
which α ∧ γ 6|=e β ∧ γ. In fact, this part of the proof is not new: it reproduces the
logic program built in the proof for Theorem 1 in (Lifschitz et al. 2001) for strong
equivalence. However, (Lifschitz et al. 2001) did not explicitly consider the concept
of strong entailment, nor its characterisation in terms of sets of models, as provided
here in Theorem 9.
Once Theorem 9 is separated as an independent result, we can easily provide an
immediate proof of Theorem 8. Combining both entailment directions of α ≡s β
amounts now to satisfying the three conditions:
(i) Jα Kc = Jβ Kc
(ii) Jα Kc ↓ ∩ Jβ K ⊆ Jα K
(iii) Jβ Kc ↓ ∩ Jα K ⊆ Jβ K
but as Jβ K ⊆ Jβ Kc ↓= Jα Kc ↓ and Jα K ⊆ Jα Kc ↓= Jβ Kc ↓ we eventually get:
(i) Jα Kc = Jβ Kc; (ii) Jβ K ⊆ Jα K; and (iii) Jα K ⊆ Jβ K. But these, altogether, are
equivalent to Jα K = Jβ K.
To conclude this section, we consider an application of Theorem 9, providing a
sufficient condition for strong entailment that may be useful in some cases. Suppose
that, apart from condition (i) of Theorem 9, we further had β |= α. Then, condition
(ii) would become trivial since Jα Kc ↓ ∩ Jβ K ⊆ Jβ K and Jβ K ⊆ Jα K. Therefore:
Corollary 3
If α |=c β and β |= α then α |=s β. 
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As an example, suppose we have a program Π = β ∧γ containing the disjunction
β = p ∨ q, typically used, for instance, to generate a choice between p and q in
ASP. This formula is classically equivalent to α = (¬p → q) ∧ (¬q → p) which is
also a common way for generating choices in ASP that does not use disjunction.
Unfortunately, it is well-known that, in the general case α and β are not strongly
equivalent. For instance, if Π = β ∧ (p → q) ∧ (q → p) we get the equilibrium
model 22 (p and q true) whereas for Π′ = α ∧ (p → q) ∧ (q → p) we get no
equilibrium model. However, β |= α in G3 and, by Corollary 3, if we replace β
by α in Π, any equilibrium (or stable) model we obtain in the new program will
also be an equilibrium model of the original one (although, perhaps, we may lose
equilibrium models with the replacement). Moreover, we can also replace β = p∨ q
by α′ = ¬p→ q or by α′′ = ¬q → p and the same property will still hold.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced an alternative formulation of equilibrium models and its mono-
tonic basis, Here-and-There (or, more precisely, Go¨del’s three-valued logic G3) that
assigns a set of models (called a denotation) to each formula. This semantics, the
main contribution of the paper, allows describingG3, classical and equilibrium mod-
els using several compact set operations. Using denotations, we have proved again
some already known fundamental results for G3 or Equilibrium Logic to show that
much textual effort usually done in the literature can be rephrased in terms of
formal equivalences on sets of interpretations that, in many cases, even amount to
simple properties from standard set theory. On the other hand, as side contributions
or applications of this semantics, we have also obtained some additional fundamen-
tal results. For instance, we have proved that, while disjunction in G3 is definable
in terms of the other connectives, conjunction is a basic operation and cannot be
derived from disjunction and implication. We have also shown that the equilibrium
models of a disjunction can be obtained in a compositional way, in terms of the
equilibrium and classical models of the disjuncts. Finally, we have defined (and
characterised in denotational terms) a new type of entailment we called strong en-
tailment : a formula strongly entails another formula if the latter can be replaced by
the former in any context while keeping a subset of the original equilibrium models.
A recent outcome of our current work is (Aguado et al. 2015) focused on the
formulation of the denotational semantics using a theorem prover so that most of the
meta-theorems for Equilibrium Logic and G3 in this paper have been automatically
checked using the PVS theorem prover (Owre et al. 1992). Future work includes the
reformulation in denotational terms of different classes of models that are known to
charaterise syntactic subclasses of logic programming (Fink 2011; Eiter et al. 2013)
and the extension to the infinitary and first order versions of Equilibrium Logic.
Finally, it would also be interesting to explore how the new definition of strong
entailment can be applied in belief update or even inductive learning for ASP.
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